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Abstract
This thesis presents a history of United States telecommunications
regulation in the 20th Century with a view toward explaining the economic
motivations of the involved parties and exploding economic myths such as
"natural monopoly"and "cross subsidization"by the application of common
sense. The relative success and failure of antitrust and economic regulation
are analyzed on a subjective but quantitative scale, with antitrust regulation
as the clear winner in terms of the author's standard of "public interest."
The thesis examines specific economic incentives resulting directly from
economic regulation, in particular, rate-of-return regulation and the FCC's
interpretations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, that has caused
uneconomic investments and conduct which is contrary to the public
interest. Suggestions are made for changes in regulatory principles and
specific actions to improve the results of economic regulation.
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I. Introduction.
Since the turn of the 20th Century, United States telecommunications
regulation has been characterized by two independent and occasionally
conflicting modes of regulation - antitrust regulation and economic
regulation. Antitrust regulation came first but has materialized as a force
for major change only sporadically, at several crucial junctures of the
industry's development. In fact, these crucial junctures can be defined by
the periods before and after each of the major telecommunications antitrust
settlements. Economic regulation came second but has been a continuous
force on the industry.
The two modes of regulation have quite different purposes. Antitrust
regulation is designed to prevent anticompetitive conduct. Its chief concern
is with the health of markets, and its intent is to enable market forces to
work by forestalling or punishing monopolistic conduct. The relationships it
regulates are those among competitors. Economic regulation, on the other
hand, is designed to protect the "public interest", a term that means
whatever the current set of regulators believes it to mean.1 Until the last 20
years, the chief concern of economic regulation has been with the
1 The standards ofboth antitrust and economic regulation are set by statute, and therefore may also be
changed by statute. The relevant antitrust statutes are Sherman Act 1-2, 15 U.S.C 1-2, which prohibit
agreements in restraint of trade and actual or attempted monopolization. Some of the relevant economic
statutes are Section 201 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 201, which prohibits any unjust or
unreasonable charges or practices, and New York Public Service Law 97, which likewise prohibits any
unreasonable rates or practices by a telecommunications utility. Both statutes give the regulators the
authority to require the utility to correct its behavior to make it reasonable. There are similar (and similarly
loose) statutes in every other State in the Union (and the District ofColumbia). The regulatory
commissions frequently define what is reasonable and proper under these statutes in terms of the "public
interest".
relationship between the telecommunications utility and the customer,
especially with respect to prices and quality of service. In the last 20 years,
the economic regulators have also adopted pro-competitive policies,2 and
economic regulation now establishes prices and rules for utility-competitor
relationships as much as it does for utility-customer relationships.
This paper examines the impacts of these two modes of regulation on
utility investment and operational decisions with an emphasis on the
Rochester, New York market, discusses the author's view of whether these
impacts have actually turned out to be in the public interest, and makes
some suggestions for legislators and regulators to improve their results in
the future. The author's definition of "public interest" is of course no more
constrained than the views of the regulators. In the interest of finding a
lodestar, this paper will view utility investment decisions in terms of
whether, using 20-20 hindsight, the impact of each mode of regulation
appears to have: maximized the development of services valuable to
consumers; maximized service quality; minimized consumer prices; and
minimized abusive conduct among actual and potential competitors. The
first three factors (service availability, service quality and price) are the key
outputs of any service industry and appear to the author to be reasonable
yardsticks for measuring the success of a public policy. The fourth factor is
premised on the proposition that competition is a good thing if it works and
2 Because the economic regulators have only the loose "public
interest"
standard to guide them, they are
free to involve themselves into any facet of the regulated utility's existence.
a judgment that unfair exploitation of one's competitors is bad. The
identification of what constitutes abuse or exploitation is as much a
personal decision as the definition of the public interest, and the author will
endeavor to justify such opinions with facts and logic.
II. A Common Sense Economic History of the Regulation of United
States Telephony.
Part 1: The Rise of the Myth of the Natural Monopoly.
After Alexander Graham Bell's invention of the telephone in 1876, the
infant telecommunications industry did not take long to start wiring up the
nation. After Bell's key patent expired in March, 1893, 3 his company,
American Telephone & Telegraph Company,4 had no legal way to prevent
competition from a host of independent telephone companies. By the turn
of the 20th Century, multiple companies were frantically wiring up the cities
and towns of the United States in an attempt to win a piece of what
everyone knew would be a huge future market.5 Although the Independents
achieved early successes in building a base of customers who wished to
communicate within each Independent's service territory, it soon became
3
Vogelsang, Ingo and Mitchell, Bridger M. (1997). Telecommunications Competition; The Last TenMiles.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press [Vogelsang], pp. 62-63; Pleasance, Charles A. (1989). The Spirit of
Independent Telephony. Johnson City, TN: Independent Telephone Books [Pleasance], p. 23.
4 This grand old name has long since been reduced to its well-known acronym, AT&T Corp., by corporate
strategists.
5 In this case, of course, everyone was right. There are obvious parallels in today's telecommunications
market, which involves multiple companies frantically laying fiber optic cable across the oceans, across the
continents and up and down the streets ofAmerica's cities. Streets in Washington, D.C. have been torn up
so often by successive fiber optic network builders that the City put a moratorium on street openings.
Layton, Lindsay. (2000, April 7). Williams Extends Ban on Digging. TheWashington Post, p. Al. This
was by no means an isolated case. Once again,
"everyone" believes that the market for broadband
communications over fiber optic cable will be enormous, and once again everyone is probably right.
apparent that customers would not be satisfied with the ability to call only
customers who happened to have telephones with the same local company.
Customers quite reasonably demanded the ability to call anyone else wired
into the increasingly ubiquitous nationwide telephone system. AT&T,
however, through its Long Lines division controlled the long distance
network, and in most cities AT&T had the largest local subscriber base.
These two factors allowed AT&T to begin to squeeze out the smaller players
by denying them connectivity and buying their assets.
This, of course, was monopolistic behavior, and the anguished pleas
of the Independents about to lose their customers (or offered a mere
pittance for their networks by the Bell System) attracted the attention of the
U.S. Justice Department, the agency in charge of administering the
relatively new Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolistic conduct.6 The
Justice Department brought a legal action charging AT&T with a violation of
the Act. After only five months of negotiation,7 AT&T agreed in December,
1913 to interconnect Long Lines with the Independents and to stop buying
out competitive Independents without regulatory approval.8 This settlement
is called the Kingsbury Commitment. It appears to have been based upon
6 See footnote 1, supra, for a legal citation to the ShermanAct, which took effect in 1 890.
7 AT&T Corporation. (1992). Events in Telecommunications History. Warren, NJ: AT&T Corp., p. 33.
8
Vogelsang at 64. By then, however, there were not many competing Independents left, especially in
larger cities. Where there were, such as in Rochester, New York, AT&T could and did sell its network to
the Independent, and an arrangement was made allowing AT&T to purchase some competing Independents
as long as it made offsetting sales of its networks. Pleasance at 86, 99-100. AT&T remained free to
acquire noncompeting Independents and continued to do so for a number of years. Pleasance at 274.
near universal acceptance of the concept of the "natural monopoly".
As a matter of common sense, a natural monopoly should be deemed
to exist only when it is impossible for multiple competitors to survive
profitably in the same market at the same time.9 The then-current thinking
appears to have been that multiple telephone lines in a single community
were a waste of society's resources, and that only one company could afford
the enormous financial resources required to build and operate a long
distance network. Both of these ideas are demonstrably absurd. Multiple
telephone companies in a single city coexisted quite well before the turn of
the 20th Century except for the problems caused by AT&T's misconduct, and
before the end of the 1990s we once again saw multiple local competitors
with their own networks and switches. AT&T managed to hang onto a long
distance monopoly until a series of FCC decisions beginning in the 1950s,
but once competitors such as MCI10 were permitted to build competing long-
haul facilities using microwave and subsequently fiber optic technology, it
became apparent that there is room in the long distance industry for as
9
Many economists would disagree with this proposition and would instead rely on factors such as the
necessity of the product, the need for uniformity, the waste of resources arising frommultiple competitors
and increasing economies of scale. Mueller, Milton L., Jr. (1997). Universal Service - Competition.
Interconnection, and Monopoly in the Making of the American Telephone System. Cambridge: The MIT
Press, pp. 12-16; Baumol, William J. and Sidak, J. Gregory. (1994). Toward Competition in Local
Telephony. Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 120-121; Sung, Nakil. (1997). Competition and Technical
Change in the U.S. Telephone Industry. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., p. 35. However, it appears
reasonable to the author that society should not protect a so-called "natural
monopoly"from competition if
indeed competitors can successfully enter the market and make a profit. Whether this constitutes a waste of
society's resources will be determined by the marketplace. It is the author's view that success in the
marketplace trumps any economic theories to the contrary.
10 MCI is another company that lost its name to an acronym. It was once namedMicrowave
Communications, Inc. It has since been absorbed by WorldCom, Inc. MCI was the pioneer in obtaining
many as a dozen facilities-based network players.
The problems giving rise to the natural monopoly myth were not real
technical or economic impossibilities. Indeed there were at the time some
problems of interoperability among the various competing local networks
being built in the same areas. However, there is no reason to believe that
the problems could not have been solved relatively simply,11 exactly the way
these issues are solved today, by:
establishing nationwide signaling standards. This had to be
accomplished in any event to allow the Independents' customers to
use the AT&T Long Lines toll network. There was no reason this
could not have been accomplished in time to allow interconnection
ofmultiple competing local telephone networks.
establishing local tandem switches, with both Bell and non-Bell
switches subtending. Once again, this had to be accomplished in
any event with toll tandem switches for the same reason as above,
to allow the thousands of Independents to connect to the AT&T
Long Lines network. With local tandem switching, common now in
all large local telephone companies, calls from a customer served
by one switch to a customer served by a second switch have a
FCC approval to operate competitive long distance facilities. Cantelon, Phillip L. (1993). The History of
MCI - The Early Years. Dallas: Heritage Press, pp. 15-16.
Some visionaries of the day had the same view. Pleasance at 96-97.
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"final route"12 through the tandem switch. All of the local switches
in the area subtend the tandem.13 Where traffic warrants, high
usage trunk groups are established directly between pairs of
switches, with the overflow traffic routed through the tandem.
There was no particular reason that this mechanism could not
have worked to connect Bell and non-Bell switches, just as today
there is no routing distinction between
ILECs'
and CLECs'14
switches.
There were also no insuperable barriers to competition in the long
haul network. Indeed at the time of the Kingsbury Commitment there were
no other active players in the long haul market beyond AT&T Long Lines,
but there is simply no reason to believe that competitors could not have
made money using traditional long-haul cables and a hierarchy of toll
switches. In the original Long Lines toll network, one that lasted for many
decades, each toll switch acted as a tandem for the level of switches below
12 A final route is the path between switches that ifblocked will prevent the call from completing.
Typically, direct trunks will be used where available, with overflow to secondary paths and a final route
through the tandem. If the call is directed to the final route and the final route is unavailable for any reason,
the caller is given a "reorder" tone (also known as "fast busy"). With modern out-of-band signaling
systems the communications channel is not actually set up until the signaling network finds a clear path,
but the routing attempts remain the same.
13 Some switches, e.g. remote switches, have only a single connection with another switch, e.g. a host
switch, although the company may establish diverse routes between the two switches. All interswitch
traffic to and from the remote must pass through the host. Only the hosts have connections with the
tandem.
14 An "ILEC" is an Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier, the
"traditional"
telephone company in a particular
territory. A "CLEC" is a Competitive Local Exchange Carrier. A
"DLEC" is a Data Local Exchange
Carrier, generally one that provides service using xDSL technology. A
"LEC" is any of the above.
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it.15 Competitors have proven since the 1960s that they can make money
using long-haul microwave and fiber optic facilities. If they had built long-
haul copper routes their trunks and switches could have been integrated
into the toll network hierarchy using the already-existent tandem switching
built into the network in the same way (discussed above) that competitive
local switches are currently integrated into the local network.
Despite the lack of economic reality in the natural monopoly concept,
AT&T succeeded in selling the nation on this idea. The presence of a
monopoly, economically valid or not, then necessitated the next chapter of
the regulatory story, the rise of economic regulation to restrain AT&T from
monopolistic pricing.
Part 2: The Industry's Long Love Affair with Economic Regulators.
AT&T ultimately controlled 80% of United States access lines and
maintained its long distance monopoly.16 Concerns over its economic power
led to the Communications Act of 1934,17 which established the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate interstate prices and
15 A "Class 5" switch was defined to be the bottom of the hierarchy, a switch providing local dial tone to
end users. Class 4 toll switches aggregated the long distance traffic of Class 5 switches, Class 3 switches
aggregated Class 4 switch traffic, and so on up to Class 1 switches. The core idea of the hierarchy was
originally that each switch would communicate only with its own subset of the switches of the class below
it, and with a single switch of the class above it, with traffic passing up the chain until it reached a toll
switch with connectivity to the desired end office (Class 5) switch. Unlike the situation with the Lodges in
the famous Boston poem ("where the Cabots speak only to Lodges, and the Lodges speak only to God"),
Bell Labs failed to develop a way for Class 1 switches to "speak only to
God"
and therefore the Class 1
switches were permitted to communicate with each other. Ultimately this hierarchy broke down, with
computer-managed multiple connections among switches of the same and different classes and
correspondingly less of a need for switches of the highest classes.
16
Vogelsang at 64.
''Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 35, 151-609.
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practices and reserved to the states the authority to regulate intrastate and
local18 prices and practices. Because all telephone companies handle both
interstate and intrastate calls, it became necessary to split the companies
up for accounting purposes between interstate and intrastate jurisdictions.
This became known as the "separations" process, which is controlled under
the 1934 Act by a Federal/State Joint Board advisory process that makes
separations recommendations to the FCC.
Both the FCC and the state regulatory commissions (a number of
which were created well before 1934) adopted the economic theory that their
rate regulation authority should be exercised in a way that would mimic
what would have been the outcome of a competitive, but not ruinously
competitive, market. The commissions recognized that their duty lay in
balancing the interests of the utilities and their consumers. For the benefit
of both, they could not regulate the utilities out of business, but for the
benefit of consumers, they could not allow unrestrained monopoly profits.
Thus began the era of rate-of-return regulation.
Under rate-of-return regulation, rates are set by a simple formula:
Revenue requirement = Allowable expenses + (Allowable return on capital *
Rate base).19 Existing rates per unit of service are multiplied by current
service volumes to calculate current revenues, and current revenues are
18 The Act gave the states regulatory authority where local areas cross state boundaries, such as in the
Washington, DC area.
19 Rate base is investment net of accumulated allowable depreciation.
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subtracted from revenue requirement. The result, if positive, is the amount
of rate increase allowed. If negative, the result is a rate decrease. The final
decision in the rate case is rate design, i.e., the rate adjustments necessary
to produce the revenue requirement.
This simple formula masks a host of issues. Thousands of people20
made their living conducting studies, preparing and presenting testimony,
cross-examining witnesses, preparing briefs and litigating appeals regarding
the details of the formula. An exhaustive list of rate case issues is beyond
the scope of this paper, but a sampling is as follows:
Revenues, expenses and investment must be stated on a
consistent basis and should reasonably reflect conditions in the
years in which the new rates will be effective. What is the
appropriate period to consider (the "test year") and what is the
methodology and required support for forecasts of a "future test
year"if allowed by the regulator?
What degree of proof is required and what are the permissible
distribution mechanisms for charges from affiliates (e.g. Bell
Labs chargebacks, "mutually
beneficial"
holding company
activities such as investor relations, and purchases of
equipment from Western Electric by Bell telephone companies)?
Are the investments and expenses allocated correctly (through
separations studies) between the interstate and intrastate
20
Including the author of this paper.
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jurisdiction and between regulated and unregulated
activities?21
What rate base allowance should be made for the cash working
capital necessary to run the business?
Is the accumulated depreciation (subtracted from original
investment costs to determine the rate base to which the rate of
return is applied) accurate in terms of both physical and
technological obsolescence? If not, what should be done with
the depreciation reserve surplus or deficiency?22
Should charitable or political contributions be disallowed as
unrecoverable expenses?
How should "one time" events in the test year be accounted for
in the formula?
Should cost increases (e.g. union wages pursuant to a new
contract) be normalized so that the test year fully reflects the
ongoing higher level of expenses? If so, should demand
increases also be normalized to end of year levels to reflect
21 The regulators do not establish rates for unregulated activities such as the sale of telephone sets, Internet
services and most inside wiring, and the investments and expenses of these activities must be removed from
the ratemaking formula. However, most commissions were successful in retaining the profits ofYellow
Pages advertising in the formula, even though the prices are not regulated. This had the impact of
subsidizing regulated rates.
22 The regulators tended to set extremely long service lives for telephone plant to hold prices down by
minimizing depreciation expense, because the investments would be amortized over a longer period of
time. The ratemaking depreciation allowance does not improve profits (because the allowed revenues
equal the booked depreciation expense) but it does provide the utility with free cash flow. Long
depreciation lives therefore required more investment to maintain cash flow.
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ongoing revenues?
What is the allowable rate of return? This is usually the most
controversial and hotly contested issue in the case. It is
generally calculated by adding up the weighted costs of debt,
preferred stock and equity in the allowed capital structure.
Should the rate of return be based on the utility's actual capital
structure and cost of debt, requiring only a decision on the
appropriate return on equity? Should the Commission use a
"hypothetical capital structure" including a hypothetical cost of
debt especially where the utility has little debt? Should the cost
of the parent company's debt be "imputed" into a subsidiary
utility's cost of equity? Should the cost of equity be determined
by examining comparable utilities, comparable unregulated
firms, Discounted Cash Flow analyses or any of a dozen other
methods?
Is the utility guilty of any imprudent investments or expenses,
using 20-20 hindsight? Most commissions used an unwritten
presumption that costs incurred directly by a regulated utility-
are prudent unless shown otherwise, but charges from affiliates
must be affirmatively proven to be beneficial to the utility's
customers.
During periods of high inflation, such as in the 1970s, costs were
increasing at such a rapid rate that large telephone companies were filing
16
annual rate cases in order to maintain reasonable profit levels. In some
jurisdictions the proceedings took a year or more to resolve, leading to
"pancaked"
rate cases each dealing with a different test year and rate
period. Appeals of adjustments and disallowances were common, leading to
further proceedings where appeals were successful.23
Because most rates were regulated by rate-of-return regulation, this
process was a top priority for utility executives and therefore utility
employees. Absent a rate increase allowed by the regulators, the only ways
to increase shareholder return were (and still are) :
to increase demand for existing profitable services;
to roll out new services preferably with higher profits than the
utility is currently earning, something generally hard to do in the
short run in an investment-intensive industry; or
to cut expenses.
None of these strategies is a long-term winner in a rate-of-return
environment, because increased revenues, increased profits from new
services and decreased expenses will all be fully recognized in the next rate
case, thus reducing revenue requirement. Everything good the utility does
is taken away from it. In return, everything bad (meaning economically
unsuccessful) gets reimbursed in the next rate case unless the utility's
23 Appellate courts generally only have a few issues before them. If they reverse the decision of the
regulatory commission on one or more issues, the only possible remedy is to remand the case back to the
commission to reflect the court's decision in the revenue requirement formula and to make appropriate rate
design adjustments. In addition, a frequent ground for reversal is the failure of the regulatory commission
17
decisions are so bad as to be found imprudent, and it is very difficult indeed
to find imprudence where the costs in question provide new services or
improve service quality. Regulators simply had no way to identify what
investments were necessary.
The rate case process therefore created an unbeatable incentive for
utilities to make new investments as the only long-term strategy to grow
profits. In the rate case formula the allowable profits are represented by the
rate of return multiplied by the rate base. Rate base in almost all
jurisdictions is net plant, meaning original cost less accumulated
depreciation. Thus the only consistent way to add profits through the rate
case process was to add new investments, which of course have minimal
accumulated depreciation.
This mode of regulation created the title of this subsection, the long
love affair between telephone companies and their regulators. Rate-of-
return regulation shielded the companies from the impacts of unnecessarily
high levels of investments or expenses, unless the
companies' decisions
were bad enough to establish imprudence. Rate-of-return regulation
intensely motivated the utilities to make new investments in the network,
keeping the regulators happy with the new services constantly being rolled
out. It really did not matter to the companies whether or not consumers
wanted to buy the new services, because the
companies'
profits flowed from
to explain its actions sufficiently. A remand after such a reversal allows the regulator to reach the original
result with a better justification.
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their investments, not from their revenues. Thus it is not surprising that
the decisions on new product offerings were more often made by a
company's engineers than by its marketing department. Engineers and
accountants (particularly those who were successful in rate case
proceedings) rather than market-driven strategists tended to rise to the top
executive ranks. Last but not least, the guaranteed recovery of all but
imprudent costs gave the utilities the ability and motivation to keep the
regulators happy by spending whatever it took to maintain an excellent level
of service quality.24
Part 3: The DOJ is Sidetracked by the Myth of Cross-Subsidization.
The long love affair with the economic regulators (the FCC and the
state regulatory commissions) did little to restrain AT&T's natural penchant
for monopoly behavior. Rate-of-return regulation's motivation to increase
investment had its dark side, the incentive to increase book investment
through accounting manipulations. It was in AT&T's self interest for the
Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) to pay top dollar to AT&T's unregulated
equipment manufacturing arm, Western Electric, because the high levels of
investment produced high levels of profits in the ratemaking formula.25 The
24
Thus, for example, New York regulation requires utilities to provide a live answer to 80% of customer
calls within 30 seconds. See NYPSC regulations, 16 N.Y.C.R.R. 603.3(k). Before 2000, the standard was
90% of calls answered within 20 seconds. Even the relaxed standard is rarely if ever achieved by fully
competitive companies, as anyone calling for software technical support knows to their dismay. Telephone
companies under rate-of-retum regulation can afford the staff required to maintain this level of answer
performance, because their expenses are flowed through the ratemaking formula and expenses necessary to
meet service quality standards are never imprudent.
25 As discussed above, there was every incentive to "gold
plate"
the network in order to create profits
arising directly from the return on investment allowed in rate-of-return cases.
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U.S. Department of Justice became convinced that AT&T was abusing
monopoly power by overcharging customers through the ratemaking
formula, that it was seeking to extend its monopoly power into unregulated
businesses and that the economic regulators were not preventing this
conduct. The DOJ therefore brought another antitrust action against AT&T
in 1949 seeking the divestiture of Western Electric. Prolonged negotiations
resulted in a settlement, and under the 1956 consent decree AT&T agreed to
confine its activities to regulated activities, to limit Western Electric to sales
to BOCs, and to license its patents to all applicants under reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms.26 This settlement was a clear victory for AT&T. It
did nothing to end the practice of overcharging the BOCs and therefore their
customers for Western Electric equipment.
Underlying the settlement was another economic myth as false as the
myth of the natural monopoly for telephone service. This myth was (and
still is) the fear of "cross-subsidization."27 The theory of cross-subsidization
is that utilities will use their regulated monopoly profits to cross-subsidize
their competitive activities and thus drive out legitimate competitors from
those arenas, extending their monopoly power. Because the settlement
addressed this concern, the DOJ was pleased with its
"victory"
of keeping
AT&T out of non-utility markets.
The reality of cross-subsidization is that the regulated and
Vogelsang at 66.
27 Id.
20
unregulated markets are not so intertwined. The only function of the
regulated market in this theory is to give the regulated utility a pot ofmoney
that allows it temporarily28 to undercut prices of competitors in the other
markets. Such a pot ofmoney, however, is available to other market players
as well. For example, a successful company in an unregulated business
may well have more money to spend in a new competitive market than a
regulated utility. In addition, a company entering an unregulated market
can raise a similar pot of money by selling equity or debt securities. There
is simply nothing special about regulated utility operations as a source of
money for new competitive ventures. Cash is cash, whatever its source, and
the inquiry should be about whether a company uses its cash in an
unlawful way, not about what is the source of the cash.29 Nevertheless, the
myth of cross-subsidization remains real in regulatory and legislative
hearings to this day. The myth leads to absurd results such as AT&T or
28 Permanent below-cost pricing would be a foolish waste of the monopolist's money. Thus the only
function of cross-subsidization would be to reduce prices long enough to drive out competitors, and then to
increase prices to monopoly levels. This analysis demonstrates another weakness of the "cross-
subsidization"
argument, which is that this conduct only makes sense if the barriers to entry in the
competitive market are high. Otherwise, the cross-subsidizing monopolist would never be able to raise its
prices to recover its losses from cross-subsidization without spurring a new round of competitive entry.
29 See Baumol, William J. and Sidak, J. Gregory. (1994). Toward Competition in Local Telephony.
Cambridge: The MIT Press, p. 62. Baumol and Sidak economically define the presence of a cross-subsidy
as a situation in which a firm is losing money in one market but is profitable overall. This situation can
obviously happen whether or not the profitable lines ofbusiness are regulated. It can be argued that the
cross-subsidizing firm has an advantage because the cross-subsidy represents essentially free capital with
no borrowing costs. However, it cannot be said that any investment of a firmwith multiple lines of
business has a different capital cost from any other investment. The cross-subsidizing firm's investment
into a (presumably) temporarily unprofitable line ofbusiness is at the expense of other uses of the funds
such as more profitable investments, debt repayment or dividends.
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Time Warner Entertainment demanding regulatory restraints30 on telephone
companies a tiny fraction of their size on the ground that the small
telephone companies might cross-subsidize competitive operations such as
startup long distance or cable television ventures with their profits from
regulated operations. The reality of the situation is that the large firms
already in the competitive markets usually have more than sufficient funds
available to undercut the prices of new market entrants, rather than vice
versa.
A "cross subsidization" claim is therefore one of the many ways
economic theory is used anticompetitively, to forestall or hinder competition
through the regulatory or legislative process rather than to compete
straightforwardly in the marketplace.31 There is no competitive participant
in the regulatory process that is not guilty of this behavior, because it is
such an easy and cheap way to attempt to minimize competitive threats.
Part 4: Cream Skimming and the End of the Love Affair.
Starting in the late 1950s, the FCC increasingly allowed competitors
into the long distance business, over the impassioned protests of AT&T that
the new entrants would only "cream
skim" the most profitable routes,
30 These proposed restraints typically involve expensive separations between the telephone company's
regulated and unregulated operations, up to and including requirements of fully separate subsidiaries or
even divestiture.
31 In the author's opinion, the only legitimate place for an argument of cross-subsidization is an assertion
that the utility is including costs of the unregulated competitive activity in the ratemaking formula. In that
one case, regulated ratepayers would indeed be cross-subsidizing unregulated activities. But even this
assertion is completely irrelevant if the utility is subject to incentive rather than rate-of-return regulation,
where the ratemaking formula no longer applies and the misallocation of costs no longer has any impact on
rates.
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leaving AT&T with the unprofitable routes and a need for drastic price
increases.
It is alleged that declining technology costs in the 1980s and 1990s
have also permitted the entry of competitors into the local exchange
business. The author believes that this is only partially true. Competitive
entry could have happened at any time, but was forestalled by three
regulatory factors:
(1) the myth of the natural monopoly and the reluctance of regulators
even to consider local exchange competition without the imposition of
economic regulation, service standards and other regulatory costs sufficient
to discourage competition;
(2) the pricing of basic local exchange service far below its embedded
cost in order to maximize the number of people and businesses connected to
the network. This direct cross-subsidy of local service by far above-cost
prices for long distance and vertical services32 made competition infeasible
until declining technology costs brought the marginal cost of competitive
entry down to a level comparable to the subsidized embedded costs charged
by the incumbents under rate-of-return regulation; and
(3) the fact that no one had yet figured out how competitors could
make monopolistic profits by taking advantage of rules set by unwary
32 Vertical services are optional add-on services such as Call Waiting or voice mail. These services have
traditionally been priced at whatever levels the market will bear. For example, CallWaiting typically is
priced at several dollars permonth, but if distributed across a sufficient number of subscribers, the cost to
the telephone company (software license fees from the switch vendor) may be less than 10 cents.
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regulators.
Naturally, most of the incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs)
made the same arguments in the local exchange arena as AT&T made in the
long distance arena, claiming that cream skimming would severely damage
the ILECs and lead to ruinous rate increases.
Rochester Telephone Corp. in 1993 decided to welcome local
competitive entry. After long negotiations, on January 1, 1995 it began the
Open Market Plan, which in turn was the primary model for the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Rochester Telephone did not reach this
decision out of public-spiritedness. Because of restrictive statutes and
regulatory decisions in New York State, it was unable to continue its
strategy of expanding its operations by acquisitions without paying an
uneconomic
"royalty" in the form of reduced rates for every future
acquisition, unless it could form a holding company.33 The New York Public
Service Commission had already twice rejected the proposal of a holding
company, so Rochester Telephone decided to tie its third holding company
proposal to something that the Commission wanted even more than the
Commission disliked the reduction of jurisdiction that a holding company
would cause. Rochester Telephone's idea was to tie the grant of a holding
company structure to the creation of the nation's first openly competitive
local exchange marketplace. Part of the bargain was the necessary
33 A holding company structure not only avoids the regulatory delays and conditions applied by regulators
in acquisition and merger proceedings, but it also allows the unregulated parent company to incur long term
debt and issue equity without the lengthy regulatory process required for utilities to issue securities.
24
elimination of rate-of-return regulation. This kind of negotiated tradeoff is
an example of how incentive regulation really works.
The specter of the death of the incumbent from "cream skimming"is a
regulatory myth used to attempt to forestall competition. The underlying
concept of cream skimming, however, is not a myth. Although the
incumbents have never died from cream skimming, the argument is far
more economically sound than the myths of natural monopoly or cross-
subsidization. To put it bluntly, the regulatory allowance of cream-
skimming competitors requires the regulatory elimination of rate-of-return
regulation.34 Had AT&T been left strictly under rate-of-return regulation
while its competitors took away low-cost traffic by charging low rates on
high-volume routes while AT&T was required to charge nationwide averaged
rates based strictly on its costs, AT&T's arguments would have been correct.
AT&T's cost per minute of toll traffic would have steadily increased, and
AT&T would have been unable to respond to the prices of its competitors.
Its rates would have continued to increase along with its average costs,
making additional routes more profitable for competitors to undercut
AT&T's new, higher prices. All of this could well have led into what utility
witnesses called a "death
spiral"for the rate-of-return regulated utility. Its
costs and prices would increase the more low-cost customers that
competitors take away, thus creating an additional layer of cream for the
34
As will be discussed infra, the regulatory response has been incentive regulation, and in particular price
cap regulation pursuant to which the utility's prices are directly regulated regardless ofprofit levels.
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competitors to skim. Exactly the same arguments apply to the allowance of
competition in local markets.
Whether they knew it or not, the economic regulators correctly
responded to competition by increasingly replacing rate-of-return regulation
with various forms of incentive regulation. In the long distance market, the
FCC has paid less and less attention to tariffed rates as competition has
developed, and recently has detariffed toll rates altogether.35 In the local
exchange markets, rate cases have nearly become a thing of the past, and
rate-of-return regulation for large companies has been almost universally
replaced by some form of price cap or incentive regulation. Under "pure"
price cap regulation such as the plan that applies to Frontier Telephone of
Rochester (the former Rochester Telephone Corp.)36 maximum rates are
established for all regulated services, with some leeway for price increases in
competitive services such as custom calling features,37 minimum
requirements are established (subject to negotiated penalties) for service
quality, and commitments are extracted to guarantee the availability of new
services and to ensure the openness of the market to competitors. Subject
to these requirements, the telephone company is then free to make whatever
investments it deems appropriate, to increase its revenues from new and
35 SeeMCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. April 28, 2000), affirming and lifting the stay
of the FCC's domestic detariffing order.
36 Opinion No. 94-25, Cases 93-C-0103 and 93-C-0033, Petition ofRochester Telephone Corporation for
Approval ofProposed Restructuring Plan and Petition ofRochester Telephone Corporation for Approval of
a New Multi Year Rate Stability Agreement, Opinion and Order Approving Joint Stipulation and
Agreement (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1994).
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existing services in any way that it can, and to hold down expenses, all
without suffering the loss of the profits made from these strategies because
there are no more rate cases to take them away. The regulatory motivation
under this form of regulation is no longer to increase investment, but
instead to increase profits through revenue increases and cost reductions.
This form of regulation ends the love affair between the telephone
company and the regulators. The telephone company has the incentive to
increase profits by letting quality of service slide, because it no longer
receives a pass-through of its expenses. Under rate-of-return regulation the
only way to increase profits was to increase prices through a rate case.
Under price cap or other forms of incentive regulation the opposite occurs -
the telephone company can increase profits any way it can other than by
increasing prices. The telephone company no longer has the incentive to
roll out new services as soon as they are technically feasible, because it may
well not be profitable to do so when investments no longer equate to profits.
In short, telephone companies begin to act like unregulated firms, and this
is an uncomfortable situation for the regulators, who have grown to expect a
quantity and quality of services based on what is technologically feasible,
not on what is profitable.
Part 5: The DOJ Tries Again and Establishes the MFJ.
AT&T in the 1960s and 1970s was not in the same position as
Rochester Telephone in the 1980s. AT&T failed to see anything to gain by
37
These are such features as Call Waiting, Call Forwarding and Caller ID.
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welcoming competition, and engaged in allegedly monopolistic conduct
through a rearguard action against its long distance competitors. First,
AT&T tried to keep long distance competitors out by fighting their attempts
to gain regulatory approval to enter the market. When that failed, AT&T
tried a policy of not connecting with the competitors. When that failed,
AT&T dragged its feet and allowed only inferior grades of interconnection.
When that failed, AT&T set very high rates for interconnection.38 All this
led to another antitrust lawsuit brought by the Department of Justice in
1974, followed by yet another round of intensive negotiations and another
consent decree in 1982. This one was called the Modification39 of Final
Judgment, or MFJ, and it went into effect at the beginning of 1984. This is
the decree that broke up the Bell System, creating the seven (since merged
to four) regional Bell holding companies and leaving AT&T with long
distance, Western Electric (eventually voluntarily divested and now called
Lucent) and Bell Laboratories.
The MFJ finally solved the problem of overcharges from Western
Electric to the former Bell Operating Companies (BOCs). The BOCs and
AT&T were no longer related, and the BOCs could and did start buying
equipment at competitive rates from other manufacturers such as Northern
Telecom40 and Siemens, thus putting an end to Western Electric's ability to
38
Vogelsang at 67.
39 This 1982 decree was a modification of the 1956 consent decree, discussed supra in Part 3 of this Section
II.
40 Since renamed Nortel Networks.
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charge monopoly equipment prices. The decree also, and primarily, put an
end to the favoritism given to AT&T's Long Lines division by its affiliated
BOCs. AT&T and its long distance competitors have been treated alike by
the LECs ever since. The decree also focused the BOCs on their local
markets and AT&T on its long distance market, to the ultimate success (at
least in terms of stock prices) of all of them and without any appreciable
damage to consumers. In hindsight it appears that the Bell System actually
had no cost savings arising from its monopoly position41 and that its size
stifled its creativity and ability to respond to the new forces of competition.
The MFJ also handed the economic regulators a large problem, that of
access charges. When AT&T controlled most of the long distance market,
there was no need to establish charges from the Long Lines division of AT&T
to the BOCs to maintain the existing toll-to-local subsidies - those subsidies
were inherent in the separations process discussed above. Independents
were compensated through a
"Settlements"
process under which the BOCs
paid them subsidies based on complicated embedded cost and traffic
formulas that had the effect of holding down Independents' rates through
the ratemaking formula. Competitive long distance providers paid for
access to the local networks through a partly negotiated, partly litigated set
of rates known as ENFIA ("exchange network facilities for interstate access") .
All this had to change, because AT&T was no longer affiliated with the BOCs
41 See Sung, Nakil. (1997). Competition and Change in the U.S. Telephone Industry. New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., pp. 89-90. Sung offers statistics indicating that even the regional BOCs after Divestiture
had no cost savings arising from their monopolies.
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and had to be treated like the competitive carriers. For interstate calls the
FCC and for intrastate calls the state regulatory commissions were required
to devise the access charge regime, payments by long distance carriers to
local exchange carriers far in excess of the relevant costs of access to the
local networks, in order to preserve the existing long distance subsidy to
local rates. A decade later, under Rochester's Open Market Plan and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, similar intercarrier compensation
schemes were found necessary for the exchange of traffic among local
network carriers.
Part 6: The BOCs Make a Devil's Bargain.
Under the MFJ, the BOCs were prohibited from offering interLATA
service. The MFJ's concept of the LATA (Local Access and Transport Area)
relegated the BOCs to short haul traffic. For example, in New York State,
90% of which was served by New York Telephone Company, the state was
carved into multiple LATAs based loosely on Buffalo, Rochester,42 Syracuse,
Binghamton, Poughkeepsie, Albany and New York City. New York
Telephone, a subsidiary of the regional Bell holding company called
NYNEX,43 could not carry any calls or offer any data services between these
arbitrary chunks of its own service territory.
42 Rochester was a special case. Because Rochester Telephone Corp. was not a BOC, it had the choice of
including its service territory with one of the adjoining BOC LATAs or declaring its territory to be in effect
an independent LATA. It chose the latter, probably because it was just starting up its own long distance
carrier, which would have a larger potential market with New York Telephone prohibited from carrying
traffic to Buffalo or Syracuse.
43 NYNEX was subsequently acquired by Bell Atlantic, which later merged with GTE and renamed the
combined company Verizon.
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Local exchange carriers (LECs) have significant cost and marketing
advantages over competitive long distance carriers if the LECs are permitted
to market long distance service. They already have a customer relationship
and customer loyalty (provided that their service is good). They are already
sending bills to most of the potential long distance customers in their
territories, and the addition of long distance billing is only a small
incremental cost. They can also use, at little cost, bill inserts to market
their own long distance services. They do not care that access charges are
far above cost, because at least the originating access charges paid by their
own long distance company merely transfer cash from one pocket to
another.44 They already have many free opportunities to attempt to
influence the customer's choice of long distance service, starting from the
first call that the customer makes to order local service45 and continuing
with every call that the customer subsequently makes to the LEC business
office.46 Local exchange carriers have similar cost and marketing
advantages when they are permitted to provide interLATA private lines or
44 The affiliated long distance carrier must also pay access charges to the LEC terminating the call.
However, if the LEC is a large BOC such as Verizon, it owns the LEC on both ends ofmany toll calls, thus
negating the impact of access charges at both ends. Unaffiliated long distance carriers such as AT&T must
absorb the cost of access at both ends. This economic advantage is lost if the LEC is subject to rate-of-
return regulation, because its above-cost access charges are reflected in lower local exchange rates. This is
yet another reason for LECs to accept surprisingly extreme negotiated conditions in exchange for
abandoning rate-of-retum regulation.
45
Existing rules allow the LEC service representative on an initial service order call to say "I can read from
the list of available long distance companies but I'd like to recommend the services of our own long
distance company, which can give you long distance service at these low rates, . . . Can I sign you up?".
46
Existing rules allow the LEC service representative on a subsequent call to say "Are you satisfied with
your current long distance carrier? May I tell you about our own long distance company's
services?"
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other data services. Far from blind to these potential advantages in the
markets denied to them, the BOCs immediately began chafing under the
restrictions of the MFJ.
At this point the BOCs were in the same position as was Rochester
Telephone when it negotiated the Open Market Plan. They needed
something from the regulators, in this case Congress because the FCC and
state commissions could not override an antitrust decree such as the MFJ.
Just as Rochester Telephone wanted a holding company, the BOCs wanted
the ability to enter the interLATA markets, and like Rochester Telephone
they were willing to open the doors to local competition in exchange for
getting what they wanted. After years of negotiation in Congress, the result
was the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Unfortunately for the BOCs, at
least initially the bargain has turned out to be a bad one for them.
No one expected that after five years under the Telecommunications
Act, which went into effect in February of 1996, there would still be only a
handful of states in which the BOCs have interLATA authority. Neither did
the BOCs expect the FCC to interpret the Act in ways so unfavorable to the
BOCs that key provisions of the Act have been rendered essentially
meaningless. Still less did the BOCs expect the Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers (CLECs) to find loopholes in the Act allowing them through a form
of regulatory arbitrage to milk both the BOCs and Independents of billions
of dollars of reciprocal compensation.47
See Section III.C infra.
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Unfortunately for the Independents, with the exception of the
infamous "checklist" of conditions for granting interLATA authority48 and
some limited exemptions for rural carriers,49 the tradeoffs made by the
BOCs in the halls of Congress ended up as market-opening requirements
that apply to the Independents as well. The Independents have always had
the ability to provide interLATA services, so they received nothing in the
bargain except the ability to act as CLECs themselves in BOC territories. A
number of Independents have started CLEC operations and are taking full
advantage of the concessions that the BOCs are continuing to give to CLECs
in their attempt to gain regulatory approvals to enter all the interLATA
markets.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 established a whole new regime
of economic regulation overseen by the FCC and the state regulatory
agencies. Rate-of-return regulation covered rates charged by ILECs to their
customers. The economic regulation regime of the 1996 Act covers the rates
charged by ILECs to CLECs and in some cases vice versa. As will be
discussed below, both forms of regulation have created perverse economic
incentives. It is the author's view that any form of economic regulation
other than letting the competitive marketplace work will produce similar
results.
48 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 271. This checklist applies only to the BOCs.
49 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 25 1(f).
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III. Economic Oddities of the 1996 Act and Rochester's Open Market
Plan.
The FCC was not happy with the 1996 Act. Not only did it represent a
bureaucratic slap in the face, a finding that the FCC had failed in its
response to local competition, but it also set a balance that was more
favorable to the ILECs and less favorable to the CLECs than the FCC, or at
least the FCC's Chairman Reed Hundt, would have preferred. The FCC
immediately set about nullifying portions of the Act and changing its
balance.50
A. The Wholesale Discount and "Avoidable" Costs.
One of the first nullifications made by the FCC was its rejection of the
Congressional standard for wholesale prices of end-to-end services
purchased by CLECs. The Act established three different modes of
competition that the CLEC could choose among. First was the option to act
as a switchless reseller, ordering end-to-end services from the ILEC at a
discount and reselling them to end users for a profit at or below the ILECs
retail rates. Second was the option to act as a pure facilities-based carrier,
with the CLEC owning its own switches and distribution plant and needing
50 FCC Chairman Reed Hundt viewed his role as "the chance of a lifetime" and directed the FCC Staff "to
be bold" in advancing the "fundamental goal ... to encourage any business to attack monopoly
incumbents." He decided that the FCC would inevitably "tilt the potential to create value toward or away
from the incumbent industries" and that "no truly neutral option existed." Hundt, Reed E. (2000). You Sav
You Want a Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 153, 155, 177. He testified in Congress
that he "aspirefd] to provide new entrants to the local telephone markets a fairer chance to compete than
they might find in any explicit provision of the
law."
Lehman, Dale E. and Weisman, Dennis L. (2000).
The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The "Costs" ofManaged Competition. Boston: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, p. 44. The author has never seen such obvious bias on the part of a prominent regulator and
such hostility toward the regulated companies.
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only to interconnect with the ILEC to exchange traffic. Third was a hybrid
option for a facilities-based CLEC to round out a partial network by leasing
small pieces of the ILEC network, called UNEs ("unbundled network
elements") and combining the UNEs with its own network. Thus a CLEC
could own its own switch but lease UNE loops from the ILEC to reach its
customers.
The standard established by the Act for calculating the discount from
retail rates that the end-to-end or "total service"reseller CLEC receives is
"any marketing, billing, collection and other costs that will be avoided by the
local exchange carrier".51 In the view of the author, the FCC completely
failed to follow this standard by setting the discount on the basis not of the
costs that the ILEC would actually avoid by converting a portion of its
business from retail to wholesale (such as incremental marketing, customer
service, billing and collection costs) but instead on the basis of the costs
that the ILEC could potentially avoid (thus the words "reasonably avoidable"
in place of "avoided") if it converted all of its business from retail to
wholesale.52 Thus the FCC presumed, quite falsely, that the ILEC would
eliminate its marketing and customer service operations and completely
dismantle its billing system. This produced a discount higher than the
actually avoided costs, forcing the ILEC to lose more money than Congress
51 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 252(d)(3).
52 First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, CC DocketNos. 96-98 and 95-185, FCC Document No. 96-325 (Fed. Comm. Comm'n Aug.
6, 1996), 1fi[91 1-920. Note: FCC documents may be retrieved from the FCC web site, http://www.fcc.gov,
by using the site's search tool and searching on the document number, in this case 96-325.
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intended on each transaction. However, it does not appear that this
regulatory rewriting of the statute has had a great deal of impact, because
even at the higher discounts ordered under the FCC's methodology there are
very few resellers operating in this "total service
resale"
mode. Apparently,
even with these discounts there is not enough margin for the reseller's own
costs of marketing, customer service, billing and collection with a profit left
over.
In contract, the Rochester Open Market Plan standard adopted a year
before the Telecommunications Act for the wholesale discount was much
simpler - Rochester Telephone (now Frontier Telephone of Rochester)
successfully negotiated a 5% discount, far smaller than the 17% discount
later ordered by the New York Public Service Commission following the
FCC's methodology. The 5% figure probably swung the balance too far in
the ILECs favor, and it led to interesting results in the marketplace. To
everyone else's surprise, AT&T roared into the residential market on
January 1, 1995, the beginning of the Open Market Plan, with full-page
local newspaper advertisements giving AT&T a local "look and
feel." To
absolutely everyone's surprise, AT&T's marketing efforts were highly
successful, and in just a few months it gained a significant share of
Rochester's residential access lines. The reason for this success turned out
to be not customer dissatisfaction with Rochester Telephone, but AT&T's
failure to take some elementary precautions. It soon became apparent that
AT&T was signing every requesting customer up for its resold service
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without attempting any kind of credit check. In a relatively small city like
Rochester, the word spread quickly. As soon as they discovered the
situation, people who had lost or were losing their Rochester Telephone
service as a result of nonpayment flocked to AT&T.53 The impact of AT&T's
failure to make credit checks was so large that Rochester Telephone's
residential access line growth, including reseller lines, was double in 1995
what it was in the years before or since. It was rumored in the industry that
AT&T's uncollectible rate exceeded 10%, in comparison to a normal rate of
less than 1% for a careful local exchange provider.54 The uncollectible rate
alone exceeded the 5% wholesale discount then available to AT&T. AT&T
ceased marketing within a few months, stopped adding new customers a
year later, and made public statements around the country about the
"failure"
of the Open Market Plan.55
In conclusion, the 5% rate was probably too low, the
"avoidable"
cost
53 AT&T subsequently accused Rochester Telephone of steering its bad debt customers to AT&T.
Rochester Telephone's public response, presented by the author of this paper, was that if a customer
appeared to be very upset with losing telephone service in the collection and shutoffprocess, Rochester
Telephone's collection representative would explain that Rochester Telephone was not the only telephone
company in town. When asked for more information the representative would refer the customer to the
Yellow Pages under "Telephone Service". In the Yellow Pages AT&T with its familiar logo and
"800"
number appeared prominently and almost at the top of the listings.
54 Interview with Brian R. Wilmarth, Frontier Telephone's credit and collections director, in 1995.
55 The Open Market Plan also originally had a cap on the total number ofnon-chargeable minutes of use on
resold "flat rate"(untimed) residential access lines, because of a concern shared by Rochester Telephone
and the Public Service Commission that resellers might order untimed residential access lines at the low
rate of $12.96 and improperly resell them to business customers, who were required to subscribe to metered
lines. The impact of this cap was that for the highest usage residential customers (such as those using dial-
up Internet services), AT&T paid a metered rate for the excess minutes that caused AT&T's wholesale
rates to exceed Rochester Telephone's retail rates. Although this cap was shortly thereafter eliminated by
the Public Service Commission, it had the effect of giving AT&T a "negative
discount" for these
customers, meaning that Rochester Telephone received more fromAT&T than it would have received from
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rate was probably too high, but it is not clear that this mode of competition
was viable in the first place. The wholesale discount should be viewed as a
clear failure of economic regulation to make sense of the competitive
marketplace.
B. The UNE Platform and Access Charges.
Perhaps in recognition of the probable failure of competition to thrive
in the total service resale mode, the FCC ordered the ILECs to make
Unbundled Network Elements available in a platform or package, where the
UNEs together made up either the equivalent of existing retail service or
some new service created by the CLEC. The ILECs took the position that
UNEs were designed by Congress to "round out" a facility-based CLECs
network, not to serve as an alternative pricing plan for total service resale.
Under the FCC's order, a CLEC instead of paying retail rates less the
wholesale discount for existing services could take the same package priced
at the incremental costs of the individual UNEs. For services such as
features and business usage rates historically priced well above cost, UNE
pricing effectively provided wholesale discounts considerably greater than
50%. 56 For example, the FCC declared that all custom calling features
inherent in a local switch would be included with the "local switching" per-
the retail customers. The author recalls that Rochester Telephone's management bonuses, based on profits,
were good that year.
56 One analyst, John S. Patton Jr. atMCG Credit Corp. estimates the UNE Platform gross profitmargin to
be 35%. TRA's Name Change Premised on Linking New 'Content
Players'
with Traditional Carriers.
(2000, May 15). Telecommunications Reports. 67. p. 10. The author believes that 35% is too low. For an
illustration ofhow to analyze the UNE Platform, see Appendix 1.
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minute UNE rate without any additional charge. A typical incrementally
costed local switching UNE, such as the one set by the New York Public
Service for Frontier Telephone of Rochester (having changed its name from
Rochester Telephone), was $.007, i.e., 7 tenths of a cent per minute. Given
the retail feature prices as high as $7 per month and business usage rates
typically ranging from 1 to 3 cents per minute, the advantage of UNE pricing
and the available profit margins for CLECs are obvious.57 Many CLECs are
now using this mode of entry for total service resale competition in lieu of
the wholesale discount, especially for Centrex services. The FCC has thus
used its economic regulation powers to make UNE pricing swallow up the
wholesale discount.
Rochester's Open Market Plan, which went into effect a year before
the 1996 Act, had a "stripped
down"
version of UNEs that priced subscriber
loops (often referred to in New York as "links") and local switch ports as
separate rate elements. However, these were not available in packages that
equated to retail services and were designed only to "round
out" CLEC
networks.
The intersection of the FCC's UNE Platform decision and Rochester's
Open Market Plan has produced an unusual result, one that is causing a
number of interexchange carriers to raise objections. Frontier Telephone is
not averse to taking advantage of regulatory loopholes the way its
competitors are allowed to do. Under the UNE Platform decision, the FCC
57 See Appendix 1 for examples of the relative discounts provided by total service resale and UNE pricing.
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decided that access charges paid by interexchange carriers are billable by
the UNE purchaser, not by the ILEC whose network supplies the UNEs.58
Access charges have historically been set well above costs to maintain the
toll-to-local pricing subsidy, and ILECs unsuccessfully argued that giving
the CLECs the access charges related to the UNEs purchased from the
ILECs would produce an unjustifiable windfall. The CLECs have taken even
more advantage of this situation by assessing access charges on
interexchange carriers many times higher than the access charges of the
underlying ILECs. They are able to do this because ILEC access charges are
subject to "price cap"regulation and a long series of decreases ordered by
the FCC, but until the last few weeks CLEC access charges have not been
regulated in any way by the FCC.59
Frontier's use of this regulatory loophole works as follows. Under the
Rochester Open Market Plan, Frontier Telephone is permitted to operate a
CLEC within its own service territory. This CLEC, Frontier Communications
of Rochester (FCR), received all of Frontier Telephone's retail Centrex
customers as part of the Open Market Plan in 1995. FCR originally bought
the underlying Centrex service from Frontier Telephone as a total service
reseller pursuant to the wholesale discount. FCR has more recently elected
58 This is another FCC-created distinction between the wholesale discount and UNE pricing. If a CLEC
elects the wholesale discount, the ILEC keeps the access charges from the interexchange carriers.
59 InApril, 2001, the FCC finally stepped in to address this situation and set a cap on CLEC access charges
beginning at 2.5 cents and gradually declining to the underlying ILEC access charge rate. Seventh Report
and Order and Further Notice ofProposed Rulemaking, Access Charge Reform - Reform ofAccess
Charges Imposed by Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket No. 96-262, FCC Document 01-
146 (Fed. Comm. Comm'n April 27, 2001).
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to use the UNE Platform to buy these Centrex services, which entitles it to
the access charges paid by interexchange carriers that relate to the UNEs it
is purchasing. FCR's access rates are no more regulated by the FCC than
those of any other CLEC. FCR is therefore charging 2.5 cents per minute
for access, which is the recently adopted FCC cap, in place of Frontier
Telephone's charges of less than 1 cent per minute to interexchange carriers
under total service resale for the same traffic.
Once again, it is apparent that economic regulation of ILEC/CLEC
charges makes little economic sense, causing carriers of all classes to
scramble to profit from regulatory loopholes and arbitrage.
C. The Reciprocal Compensation Disaster.
Rochester Telephone shot itself in the foot in 1994 when it negotiated
a high rate for reciprocal compensation in the Open Market Plan.
Reciprocal compensation is the amount that ILECs and CLECs pay each
other to terminate local traffic. The theory of reciprocal compensation is
that the originating LEC is getting paid by its customer for the traffic, even if
the payment is subsumed in an unmetered per-month rate for the access
line, and that the terminating LEC is getting nothing and therefore should
be compensated by the originating LEC for terminating the inter-network
traffic. Reciprocal compensation applies only when the two carriers in
question each own a local switch, and it applies only when the traffic is local
in nature. A total service reseller is not incurring any network costs of
termination and is therefore not entitled to reciprocal compensation. Toll
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traffic, on the other hand, is subject to a completely different compensation
mechanism, that of access charges. If an inbound or outbound interLATA
call transits the networks of both an ILEC and a CLEC,60 access charges
should be paid to both local networks by the interexchange carrier that is
getting the customer's revenue for the call, but the ILEC and CLEC do not
compensate each other.
Economically the theory of reciprocal compensation is another myth.
When a customer orders service and the ILEC or CLEC installs a line and
connects it to a local switch, the line and switch are neither sized nor priced
on the basis of only the outgoing traffic that the customer is generating.
The underlying assumption of reciprocal compensation, that the terminating
carrier needs to be compensated by the originating carrier, is simply false
because the terminating carrier is getting paid for line and switching
capacity by the customer who receives the calls as part of the customer's
monthly service charge.
In addition, reciprocal compensation should normally be relatively
small unless a carrier is choosing to distort its traffic patterns by picking
customers. An average mix of customers should generate and receive the
same number of calls because each call has an originator and a recipient.
Therefore except for small oddities like three way calls originating minutes
always equal terminating minutes. Even if a CLEC has only a handful of
customers, if they are average customers they will generate and receive the
60 This is a frequent occurrence, because interexchange carriers never have direct connectivity to all CLECs
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same volume of local traffic, and the minutes between the ILEC and the
CLEC will be in balance. Thus, to the extent a CLEC has an average mix of
customers and traffic, reciprocal compensation is irrelevant because the
same amount would be paid for the equivalent traffic in each direction. To
the extent this is not true, it is likely that one of the carriers is getting a
windfall. Why, then, did Rochester Telephone negotiate reciprocal
compensation into the Open Market Plan? As usual, the reason was
economic self-interest.
Rochester Telephone when it negotiated the Open Market Plan in
1993 and 1994 was convinced that CLECs with their own switches would
target business customers with high metered local usage charges, called
LMS ("local measured service"), priced far above its costs. The CLECs in the
negotiations had the same idea. Therefore Rochester Telephone asked for
high reciprocal compensation charges, equivalent to its intrastate access
charges of 2.2 cents per minute, in the hopes that it would be able to retain
a large share of the LMS revenues that CLECs would try to win, because the
vast majority of the
CLECs' LMS traffic would continue to be terminated on
the Rochester Telephone network. The CLECs, on the other hand, proposed
that there would be no reciprocal compensation payments, a so-called "bill
and
keep"
regime under which the originating carrier bills its end user for a
call and keeps the revenues. Rochester Telephone won the argument and
thus lost the war.
and frequently connect to a LATA only through the ILECs access tandem.
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In the first year of the Open Market Plan things went about as
expected. Switch-based CLECs targeted business customers with high LMS
volumes, the balance of traffic flowed from CLECs to Rochester Telephone,
and Rochester Telephone benefited financially from the high reciprocal
compensation rate.
Neither Rochester Telephone nor the CLECs anticipated the advent of
the Internet, leading to a disaster of enormous proportions for Rochester
Telephone and ultimately the entire ILEC industry when the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 also mandated reciprocal compensation,
albeit at lower rates than those specified in the Open Market Plan.
Beginning in the mid 1990s and rapidly accelerating thereafter, dial-up
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) sprang up, some of which (including
Frontier Telephone's own Internet service) offered a flat monthly rate for
unlimited Internet usage. Time Warner Communications, the switch-based
CLEC in Rochester that had proposed bill-and-keep in the negotiations,
managed to attract to its network most of the local dial-up Internet access
lines of America Online, Inc., which is now Time Warner's corporate parent.
AOL through good marketing and the simplicity of its Internet interface
attracted the lion's share of the Internet market, even though it did not
allow unlimited usage at a flat monthly rate. Suddenly AOL reversed its
position, offered a flat rate, and the floodgates opened. Over the next few
months Frontier Telephone's engineers worked frantically to install more
trunks directly from a number of Frontier end offices to Time Warner's
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switch, as well as along the final route from Frontier's local switches to the
local tandem and thence to Time Warner's switch. AOL's vastly increased
incoming calls brought Frontier's network to its knees, changing the busy
hours of the switches serving residential customers and causing hours-long
trunk blockages in some switches every evening after customers came home
from work.61 The only remedy was for Frontier to install hundreds of new
trunks. Within two or three months the network was back to normal
blockage levels, although AOL's traffic continued (and to this day continues)
unabated.
This situation was a bitter pill for Frontier Telephone to swallow. It
was installing hundreds of trunk groups at very large costs for the sole
purpose of sending more traffic to Time Warner, every minute of which was
subject to the payment of reciprocal compensation. The tables had been
turned. Now the originating carrier was receiving nothing for the traffic,
because it was almost all traffic from unmetered residential lines, and the
receiving carrier was getting huge revenues for the near-zero costs of
terminating massive call volumes to a single customer located in or close to
Time Warner's building. It is true, as Time Warner has frequently argued,
that a number of Frontier Telephone customers installed second lines for
Internet traffic and thereby incrementally increased Frontier's revenues, but
second unmetered lines only exacerbated the situation. The customer only
61 The normal engineering standard for sizing interoffice trunk groups is P.01, a 1% probability that a call
will be blocked in the busiest hour of the month. Some ofFrontier's switches were experiencing blocking
ofup to 50% of interoffice calls for hours at a time on many successive days.
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had to be on-line to a Time Warner AOL number for roughly 20 minutes per
day for the reciprocal compensation charge of $.022 to exceed the monthly
$12.96 unmetered residential rate, and many of these customers with
dedicated modem lines were staying on the Internet up to 5 hours per day,
because they could still make and receive voice calls on their primary lines.
Frontier Telephone began paying Time Warner several hundred thousand
dollars per month in reciprocal compensation. Although the reciprocal
compensation rates have since been negotiated downward the amount of
one-way traffic has increased, and Frontier's payments to Time Warner
remain at the same general levels.
Other CLECs immediately saw the benefit of this regulatory loophole.
Even with reciprocal compensation rates as low as a few tenths of a cent per
minute the ability to act as a "Black Hole
carrier"(one that only receives
traffic and generates little or no traffic in the other direction) has been a
license to coin money at the expense of the ILECs. The BOCs report that
they are paying well over a billion dollars a year in reciprocal compensation,
not a surprising number in light of the millions of dollars paid annually to
CLECs in Rochester alone. The BOCs and Frontier Telephone heartily wish
that bill-and-keep had been established as the order of the day.
The FCC has recently attempted to reduce this regulatory distortion of
the marketplace. It has established a cap of $.0015 for reciprocal
compensation for Internet-bound local traffic, with the cap declining over
the next few years to $.0007. Growth in Internet traffic is capped at 10%,
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with traffic over the threshold subject to no compensation (bill-and-keep).
Unless a carrier can make actual measurements, any traffic between an
ILEC to a CLEC above a 3:1 ratio in the direction of the CLEC is presumed
to be Internet traffic. A CLEC entering a new territory immediately moves to
bill-and-keep for Internet traffic.62
This FCC order will by no means resolve the reciprocal compensation
issue. It will be appealed immediately by CLECs that see a major source of
revenue drying up, and perhaps also by state regulatory commissions
objecting to the order's preemption of state jurisdiction over Internet-bound
traffic. In addition, it is easily possible for a CLEC to target its activities so
that it still remains a Black Hole carrier even without Internet traffic. ACC
Corp. in Rochester (since purchased by Teleport which in turn has been
purchased by AT&T), has long followed a strategy of attracting free local
chat lines onto its network. This traffic is undeniably local and is in no way
subject to the reduced rates in the recent FCC order. Similarly, CLECs
could focus their business on inbound customer call centers,63 such as
Rochester Gas & Electric's customer service numbers. Alternatively, CLECs
could offer to provide PBX customers with their inbound trunks only,
leaving Frontier Telephone to provide the outbound trunks. This type of
service offering is easily marketed as an additional margin of safety for the
62 Order on Remand and Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 - Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic. CC Docket Nos. 96-
98 and 99-68, FCC Document 01-131 (Federal Commun. Comm'n April 27, 2001).
63
The same strategy could be applied to other customers with predominantly inbound traffic such as pizza
parlors and cab companies, and to a lesser extent retail stores.
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customer, with paths to the network provided through two different local
carriers. All of these strategies continue to allow the Black Hole CLEC to
milk the ILEC through reciprocal compensation payments far in excess of
the CLECs actual switching costs.
Another remaining problem involves the ability of cellular carriers to
claim "asymmetric reciprocal compensation," i.e., the receipt of higher
compensation for traffic terminated by them than they pay for traffic
originated by them. Two FCC Bureau Chiefs recently stated that these
carriers can demand asymmetric compensation if they can prove that their
costs are higher than the ILECs, despite the fact that their cellular end
users are already paying them for terminating incoming traffic.64 Given all
these remaining issues, solving the Internet problem will obviously not
make reciprocal compensation abuses go away.65
Once again economic regulation has failed. As will be discussed
below, the incentives created by reciprocal compensation actually work to
decrease, not increase, competition.
64 FCC Officials: CMRS Carriers May Seek Extra 'Recip
Comp.' (2001, May 14). Telecommunications
Reports. 67, p. 19.
65 To give it credit, the FCC is proposing a more generic solution that would move all intercarrier
compensation toward a bill-and-keep regime, including the per-minute access charges that ILECs apply to
IXCs. Notice ofProposed Rulemaking, Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime. CC
Docket No. 01-92, FCC Document 01-132 (Federal Commun. Comm'n April 27, 2001). However, such
changes would have serious impacts on LECs that depend on access charges. Many rural ILECs receive
more than half their total revenues from IXCs in the form of access charges. To keep themwhole under a
bill-and-keep regime, either Universal Service Fund subsidies would have to be drastically increased, or
average rural local rates could exceed $50 per month. Moreover, even a change to bill-and-keep solely for
ILEC/CLEC reciprocal compensation for other than Internet traffic would require Congressional
amendment to the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
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D. Cellular Carriers' Local Exchange Areas.
In its interpretations of the 1996 Act, the FCC determined that
cellular carriers (also known as CMRS or Commercial Mobile Radio Service
carriers) should be treated like facilities-based CLECs for purposes of
interconnection and reciprocal compensation 66 However, it was not simple
to determine what calls should be considered local and what calls should be
considered long distance and therefore outside the scope of the Act.
Consistent with what the author views as a longstanding anti-ILEC bias, the
FCC defined the CMRS local calling area for purposes of the Act as a Major
Trading Area. An MTA is a far larger entity than a Metropolitan Service Area
or MSA. For example, Rochester is part of the Buffalo MTA, which stretches
as far west as Erie, Pennsylvania. Therefore calls from a Frontier Telephone
of Rochester customer to a mobile customer in Erie, a three-hour drive away
at freeway speeds, must be compensated like a local call to a CLEC
customer in Rochester.67 This rule does not make economic sense to the
ILECs and appears to them to be a regulatory subsidy to cellular carriers
created by a twisted reading of the economic regulation provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
E. Service to Paging Carriers.
Paging carriers are also considered CMRS carriers in the FCC's
66 First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, CC Docket Nos. 96-98 and 95-185, FCC Document No. 96-325 (Fed. Comm. Comm'n Aug.
6, 1996), 1J11087-89.
67 If the call were considered long distance, no compensation would be paid.
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parlance. They also have something like a switch that translates local calls
into radio signals for paging. This was a close enough analogy for the FCC
to declare that paging carriers are also CLECs entitled to all of the
interconnection benefits of the Act. However, the FCC recognized that the
analogy to CLECs broke down when applied to reciprocal compensation,
and denied paging carriers the right to reciprocal compensation for their
incoming traffic unless they can prove their costs.68 Once again it appears
to the ILECs that the FCC is twisting the Act as far as it can go in favor of
other carriers against the ILECs.
The key problem with declaring paging carriers to be CLECs is that
under the Act, each local carrier is responsible for the costs of delivering its
traffic to other ILECs and CLECs. Paging carriers generate no appreciable
outbound local traffic, and to the extent they offer two-way service the
outbound channel is narrow enough to handle with fairly inexpensive
telecommunications services. The inbound channel, however, can be very
large. In addition, paging carriers are required by technology and zoning
regulations to locate their transmitters on high, remote hilltops. If the ILEC
is required to bring its traffic to the paging carrier and the paging carrier
chooses to locate its
"switch"
at the transmitter, the unreimbursed
construction and operating costs to the ILEC can be very large. As soon as
the FCC issued its ruling paging carriers immediately began disputing the
68 First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. CC Docket Nos. 96-98 and 95-1 85, FCC Document No. 96-325 (Fed. Comm. Comm'n Aug.
6, 1996), UHl 092-93.
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ILEC charges they had been paying for decades to handle inbound traffic.
Subsequent rulings and even a threat of fines confirm that the FCC intends
for ILECs to pay for facilities to handle traffic to a paging carrier's "switch".69
Once again it appears that the economic regulation of the Act is
failing. The mechanism of the Act is being used to create new and
unjustifiable subsidies to reduce the telecommunications expenses of
service providers that are perfectly capable of paying the costs of their own
businesses. There is no reason why ILECs should underwrite the costs of
serving paging service providers.
IV. The Incentives Caused by Economic Regulation.
Rate-of-return regulation clearly created the incentive to "gold
plate"
the network. As discussed more fully above, the only way to earn consistent
and increasing profits under rate-of-return regulation was to maximize rate
base, which required large and continuing investments in the network.
From a consumer standpoint this was good for service but bad for prices.
To placate the regulators, utilities had the incentive to incur whatever costs,
either capital or expense, were necessary to provide a very high quality of
service. The costs were recovered in full through the rate case process, and
regulators received little political pressure as long as the underlying rates
did not get too high. The main job of the regulators was to adjudicate rate
cases and make such adjustments (frequently to rate of return) as were
69 FCC Hands Paging Carriers Victory in Battle with LECs over Compensation. (2000, June 26).
Telecommunications Reports. 66. pp. 7-8.
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necessary to hold the rate increases to politically acceptable levels.
Price cap regulation, such as Frontier Telephone's pure70 price cap
regulation and the pure price cap regulation available at the FCC for
interstate access charges, created nearly the opposite incentives, but
arguably the incentives from price cap regulation are much closer to the
incentives of the unregulated marketplace. ILECs are motivated to do
whatever they need to do to produce profits, while keeping their quality of
service high enough and their product lines modern enough to avoid
problems from the regulators and their customers.
The new forms of economic regulation of the relationship between
ILECs and CLECs established by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
the earlier Rochester Open Market Plan create a whole new set of economic
incentives. CLECs are motivated to install otherwise unnecessary switches
to reap the large benefits of reciprocal compensation. However, CLECs are
strongly motivated not to engage in facilities-based competition for
residential customers for exactly the same reason - reciprocal
compensation. A CLEC winning an unmetered residential customer is
suddenly in the unenviable position of the ILEC, with the easily possible
result of being required to pay more in reciprocal compensation to the other
70 Price cap regulation that is not
"pure" involves the sharing of earnings above a predetermined rate of
return level. The calculation of shared earnings necessarily involves working through the entire ratemaking
formula, with all of its test year and forecasting issues and regulatory adjustments. The only step made
unnecessary is the determination of the allowable rate of return. Sharing calculations are generally made
with much less formality than rate case decisions, presumably because far less is at stake. However, any
importation of sharing into a price cap plan brings with it some of the "gold
plating"incentives of rate-of-
return regulation.
52
networks called by the customer than the CLEC receives in total from the
customer. In this situation the CLEC risks losing money on every customer
from reciprocal compensation alone, and the CLECs costs of providing
service to the customer create still further losses. No rational facilities-
based CLEC provides unmetered service to residential customers unless it
does not care about losing money.71 Given the apparent economic non-
viability of the other mode of competition, total service resale,72 there should
be no surprise that the Open Market Plan and the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 have failed to produce any sustained competition for residential
customers.73
Other arguably perverse incentives created by the economic regulation
under the 1996 Act and the Open Market Plan are:
the incentive for CLECs to do anything it takes, including the
provision of free local service and the sharing of the receipts from
reciprocal compensation, to attract Black Hole customers such as
Internet Service Provider's onto a their networks (which may be as
71 The CLEC may actually not care about losing money if it is engaged in a limited marketing and technical
trial of competition. This is arguably what both AT&T and Time Warner were engaged in when they
offered service to residential customers in Rochester at the inception of the OpenMarket Plan.
Alternatively, as discussed in Section III.A supra, AT&T may have been prepared to lose money as a
reseller in Rochester to further its national goal of establishing resale discounts ofmore than 20%. Most
facilities-based CLECs, however, act with economic rationality and do not even offer traditional dial tone
service to residential customers, or do so only at an uneconomically high rate.
72 Residential total service resale is not subject to the reciprocal compensation problem, because the total
service reseller does not have a network and therefore does not pay (or receive) reciprocal compensation.
73 Schiesel, Seth. (2000, Nov. 21). For Local Phone Users, Choice Isn't an Option. The NewYork Times
on the Web, available on 1 1/21/00 at http://www.nytimes.eom/2000/l l/21/business/21PHON.html. See
also Sprint Quits as Residential CLEC. (2001, Mar. 30). State Telephone Regulation Report, 19. p. 7; Sbc
Scales Back Plans for Local Telephone Service. (2001, Mar. 19). CNET Investor, available on 3/19/01 at
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small as a single switch). Conversely, there is a large incentive for
CLECs to avoid any class of customers generating more traffic than
it receives.
where the CLEC is not pursuing a Black Hole strategy, the
incentive to use ILEC facilities, either total service resale or UNE
Platform, rather than make its own investments. Both options
allow the CLEC to enter and remain in the market with almost no
capital investment and the ability to withdraw immediately and
without penalty from all or any portion of the market by canceling
the month-to-month services it is obtaining from the ILEC. CLECs
that sink capital into a real network face far greater risks, and
therefore have trouble raising capital. However, for
"real"
competition to develop there must be more than just resellers and
Black Hole CLECs with no investment beyond a switch.
the use of the UNE Platform rather than wholesale "avoidable cost"
discounts to obtain effective discounts from retail rates in the
range of 50% and more, without risking any network investment or
providing any services beyond what the ILEC offers.
the incentive for CLECs to gouge interexchange carriers with
whatever level of access charges may escape action by the
regulators.
the ability of cellular carriers to subsidize themselves from
http://investor.cnet.com/investor/news; and Sprint Ditches CLEC Offerings, Blames High Rates for UNEs.
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reciprocal compensation within the Major Trading Area.
the incentive for paging carriers to locate their local
"switches" in
remote transmitter areas because they bear none of the costs of
transporting their incoming traffic.
All of these incentives have driven the ILECs' and CLECs' investment
decisions. Rate-of-return regulation created unnecessary investments of all
kinds. Reciprocal compensation is causing an explosion of competitive local
exchange switches and forestalling competition for residential services.
UNE Platform pricing is a strong reason for CLECs not to build competitive
outside plant. The treatment of paging carriers as CLECs motivates paging
carriers to locate their facilities far away from existing network plant. None
of these economic distortions appear to be a benefit to the public interest. It
is therefore appropriate to step back and take a look at whether regulation
has in general been successful in terms of advancing the public interest.
V. Have Antitrust and Economic Regulation Benefited the Public
Interest?
A. Antitrust Regulation Has Generally Benefited the Public Interest.
The major antitrust initiatives discussed in this paper were:
1. the 1913 lawsuit leading to the Kingsbury Commitment;
2. the 1949 lawsuit leading to the 1956 consent decree; and
3. the 1974 lawsuit leading to the 1982 Modification of Final
Judgment.
01, Jan. 12). Telecommunications Reports.67. p. 15.
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As noted in the Introduction, the public interest standard used in this
paper is whether, using 20-20 hindsight, the impact of the mode of
regulation appears to have:
maximized the development of services valuable to consumers;
maximized service quality;
minimized consumer prices; and
minimized abusive conduct among competitors or potential
competitors. The following analysis uses a somewhat subjective scale of -3
to +3 to rate each element of regulation on each factor and will equally
subjectively presume that each factor is entitled to equal weight. Positive
numbers are "better".
1. The Kingsbury Commitment appears to have had little impact on
the development of services. By establishing guaranteed interconnectiviry
between the Bell System and the Independents, it markedly improved
service quality. It probably had an adverse (upward) impact on prices by
reducing local competition and perpetuating the Long Lines long distance
monopoly. Absent the Kingsbury Commitment, the Independents might well
have constructed competing long distance networks. The primary impact of
the Kingsbury Commitment was to eliminate abusive practices by Bell
against the Independents with respect to interconnection, and it appears to
have succeeded completely in its goal. On the above scale, the author offers
the following ratings:
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New Services 0 (no impact)
Service Quality +2 (Independents connect with Bell System)
Lower Prices -2 (local and long distance monopolies)
Less Abusive conduct +3 (Independents treated fairly)
Net Rating: +3
2. The 1956 antitrust consent decree was in the author's view a
failure. It appears to have had no impact on new services or service quality.
It did not solve the primary problem then at hand, the unjustifiable markup
ofWestern Electric products to BOCs in order to inflate rate base and rates.
It did provide for mandatory patent licensing to competitive manufacturers,
which to some extent minimized abusive conduct, but in the view of the
author the whole point of the patent system is to give the inventor monopoly
rights for a period of time in order to stimulate innovation. It follows that
there is nothing prima facie wrong with refusing to license patents to
competitors. However, the patent licensing, particularly of transistor and
laser technologies, may well have had significant positive impacts on the
development of new services in other industries. These considerations lead
to the following ratings:
New Services +1 (external impact of patent licensing)
Service Quality 0 (no impact)
Lower Prices - 1 (continued Western Electric overpricing)
Less Abusive conduct +1 (patent licensing to AT&T's competitors)
Net Rating: +1
3. The Modification of Final Judgment created enormous changes
in the industry, by mandating the breakup of the Bell System, the
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restriction of the BOCs to intraLATA services, and the advent of access
charges. The new competition in the provision of equipment to the BOCs
stimulated both Western Electric and its competitors to maximize their new
feature capabilities. In addition, each BOC now had to compete with the
others in the capital markets, leading each BOC to try to appear as the most
successful in the marketplace and the most forward-looking. Both factors
stimulated new service development. Service quality did not appear to
decline as a result of Divestiture despite some claims to the contrary.74 In
fact, other carriers began to compete on service quality as well as price (e.g.,
Sprint's "pin drop" campaign), forcing all carriers including AT&T to
maintain high service quality, and possibly causing AT&T to invest in a
nationwide fiber optic network before it would otherwise have done so. Local
prices increased a little as a result of a round of Divestiture rate cases in
which the BOCs successfully argued that their expenses would increase and
that their risk (and therefore cost of capital) was greater.75 However, since
Divestiture long distance prices have tumbled.76 Once again, the primary
impact of the proceeding was to end abusive competitive practices, in this
case toward long distance competitors. Divestiture succeeded completely in
putting AT&T on an equivalent footing with its long distance competitors
74
Kraus, Constantine Raymond and Duerig, Alfred W. (1988). The Rape ofMa Bell. Secaucus, NJ: Lyle
Stuart Inc. [Kraus], p. 192.
75
The author participated in one of these cases in Virginia.
76 Kraus at 192.
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with respect to the BOCs.77
New services +2 (innovation by suppliers and BOCs)
Service quality + 1 jpin drop" competition)
Lower Prices +1 (local prices up, toll prices down by more)
Less Abusive conduct +3 (AT&T treated like other LD carriers)
Net Rating: +7
B. Economic Regulation Has An Ambiguous Impact on the Public
Interest.
The modes of economic regulation examined in this paper are:
1. rate-of-return regulation;
2. price cap regulation; and
3. intercarrier pricing under the Telecommunications Act of
1996 and the Rochester Open Market Plan.
1. Rate-of-return regulation, because of its incentive to add
investment to maximize profits, definitely stimulates the development of new
services. However, as explained above the services developed are not
necessarily those that consumers want, because the company under rate-of-
return regulation increases profits by adding investment, not by adding
revenues. Rate-of-return regulation also maximizes service quality as part
of the long term love affair between the utilities and the regulators,
discussed more fully above. Prices, however, are constrained only by the
political forces facing the regulators. Abusive practices toward competitors
are not directly affected, although the guaranteed profits from rate-of-return
77 Based on personal observation of regulatory proceedings, the BOCs are even more hostile to their former
owner than to other long distance carriers.
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regulation create a market advantage that new entrants would not have.
The author views this situation as a built-in abusive practice.
New Services: +2 (not necessarily what customers want)
Service Quality +3 (gold plated)
Lower Prices -3 (constrained primarily by political forces)
Less Abusive Practices -1 (entry barriers)
Net rating: +1
2. Price cap regulation forces the utility to act as an unregulated
company would behave. Compared to rate-of-return regulation, the
incentives to roll out new services and to maximize service quality are
definitely less, but compared to the unregulated market the incentives are
about equal. The company will provide the new services that the customers
want to buy, and will maintain sufficient service quality to keep it out of
trouble, but there is an economic incentive to hold down capital spending
and to let service slip. The cap on prices gives customers far more
protection and certainty than either rate-of-return regulation or a fully
competitive market. Abusive practices are not directly affected, and because
price cap regulation offers no guaranteed profits, there is no built in entry
barrier.
New Services 0 (same as fully competitive market)
Service Quality -2 (motivation to save expenses)
Lower Prices +3 (price caps very stable)
Less Abusive Practices 0 (no impact)
Net Rating: +1
3. Intercarrier pricing is a mixed bag of policies with a similar mix
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of impacts. Taken as a whole, the primary impact of the 1996 Act and the
Open Market Plan has been to increase competition, but only in limited
areas. CLECs should be motivated to offer innovative new services, but few
are doing so with any success. CLECs are motivated to pay ISPs and
other Black Hole customers to move onto the CLECs' networks but to leave
residential customers alone. It appears that prices are falling as a result of
competition79 but it also appears that service quality may be falling as
well.80 Cellular and paging carriers are receiving regulatory subsidies from
the ILECs, and it is far from clear that consumers are receiving any benefit
from the subsidies. UNE Platform pricing likewise appears to be a
regulatory subsidy to CLECs, and CLECs who use the UNE Platform are
only reselling ILEC network services without risking their own investment
dollars. It is not apparent that consumers will benefit in the long run from
carriers that enter and exit the market at the drop of a hat, depending on
the profitability of reselling UNEs. It is certainly not in the public interest to
allow CLECs to gouge interexchange carriers with access charges many time
78
Many of the Data LECs (DLECs) such as Northpoint and Covad are either in or near bankruptcy. They
attempted to offer Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) services more quickly than the ILECs. However, they
have found that the revenues they have been able to achieve do not offset the costs and technical difficulties
of collocation (occupying space in the ILEC central office), line sharing (where the ILEC provides
traditional voice service and the DLEC provides DSL service over the same line), line quality (the line
cannot have bridge taps or load coils for DSL service to work) and the "bleeding
edge"
nature ofmost DSL
equipment.
79
New York Public Service Commission Press Release. (2000, Sept. 20). NYPSC Issues Telecom Report:
Competition Intensifying - Independent Consumer Group Hails $220 MillionAnnual Savings forNew
York Consumers. Available onNYPSC web site http://www.dps.state.nv.us.
80 New York Public Service Press Release. (2000, Nov. 9). CommissionMoves to Improve High Capacity
Telecommunications Service - Seeks Comment onMeasures to Strengthen Verizon's Special Services.
The PSC Chairman stated, "[I]t appears that the appetite for these services in the competitive market has
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those of the underlying ILEC, given that the ILEC access charges themselves
are generally well above cost due to the continuation of the historical toll-to-
local subsidy. The current ratings are below, but as will be discussed in the
next section, they could readily be improved.
New Services +1 (DLECs)
Service Quality - 1 (dropping a little)
Lower Prices +2 (reduced by competition)
Less Abusive Practices -3 (reciprocal compensation, etc.)
NetRating: -1
C. Conclusions.
If the ratings above are accepted, it is apparent that antitrust
regulation of the telecommunications industry has been generally more
successful than economic regulation.
Antitrust Regulation:
Kingsbury Commitment +3
1956 Consent Decree +1
Modification of Final Judgment +7
Total +11
Economic Regulation:
Rate-of-return regulation +1
Price cap regulation + 1
Intercarrier pricing - 1
Total +1
Perhaps this result should be expected, because antitrust regulation
is episodic in nature and designed to solve particular problems, while
economic regulation is pervasive and must balance more interests. One
outstripped the company's ability to meet the
demand." Available onNYPSC web site:
http://www.dps.state.ny.us.
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conclusion that may be drawn is that economic regulation is not necessarily
the correct response to concerns about anticompetitive conduct. The
relationship between ILECs and CLECs is the type of issue successfully
addressed in the Kingsbury Commitment (which addressed the relationship
between BOCs and Independents) and the MFJ (which addressed the
relationship between BOCs and AT&T). Antitrust regulation appears to be
much better designed to eliminate abusive conduct than the pervasive
economic regulation of the Telecommunications Act or 1996 and the Open
Market Plan. The economic regulators are experts in utility/consumer
transactions, but less than expert in correctly establishing the ground rules
for competition.
A few other conclusions may be drawn, again if the ratings are
accepted:
Consumers are not any better off under price cap regulation than
rate-of-return regulation. However, they are also no worse off. Because
rate-of-return regulation is incompatible with competition, as argued above,
it appears that the regulators have made a reasonable choice to move to
price cap regulation. Except for out-of-work rate case witnesses and
lawyers,81 there is no reason to yearn for "the good old
days"
of rate-of-
return regulation.
The antitrust regulators (primarily the U.S. Department of Justice)
81 In reality, rate case lawyers had nothing to worry about. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 has with
some accuracy been called "The
Economists'
and
Lawyers' Full Employment Act of
1996"
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can be fooled by economists. They allowed the Bell System to divert them
from their primary mission of reducingWestern Electric markups in order to
hare off down the false trail of cross-subsidization.
On the assumption that in the long run consumers will pay for
everything, consumer welfare is not being maximized by giving CLECs
incentives to install switches and provide free local service merely to earn
reciprocal compensation for a handful of Black Hole customers, nor are
consumers benefiting from the requirement for ILECs to give free inbound
service to paging companies.
Neither regulators nor competitors will successfully predict
technology changes. The advent of dial-up Internet service ruined the
ILECs'
plans to hold competitors at bay by assessing high reciprocal
compensation charges for local traffic. The increasing replacement of dial-
up Internet service by higher-speed Digital Subscriber Line and cable
modem services will have unknown consequences.82 Fixed wireless data
service may finally come into its own (despite the recent bankruptcy of its
chief advocate Winstar), just as cellular service is now becoming nearly
ubiquitous more than 50 years after the development of its technology.
Finally, no one knows what the "killer
application"for consumer data
service will be. Pay-per-view was thought to be a contender but now seems
82
The author would predict decreasing reliance on reciprocal compensation (data traffic is not subject to
reciprocal compensation), increased local infrastructure investments (to make both telephone and Cable TV
plant ready for broadband), and an increasing array ofdigital and high capacity consumer services (to use
the new bandwidth).
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to be only another
"niche"
market. Whatever the killer application may be,
it will drive the future of local telephony investment.
VI. Conclusions and Proposals for Improved Regulation.
It is not possible to turn the clock back to rate-of-return regulation.
Price cap regulation is clearly here to stay, until regulators are willing to
take the plunge and completely deregulate the prices of competitive services.
The FCC in its detariffing orders is deregulating interstate prices.83 Nearly
all state regulatory commissions have "individual case basis" pricing
mechanisms to allow ILECs to provide market rates for fully competitive
services such as Centrex.84 Regulators should be prepared to step aside in
additional areas and let the market work when the market is competitive,
although the definition of what is sufficiently competitive is a hard and
complex issue. Regulators should experiment with deregulation where the
issue is a close one, retaining the right to re-regulate if the experiment fails.
The author believes that the regulators will find that deregulation stimulates
competition far more effectively than the detailed economic regulation of
83
Intrastate toll prices generally remain tariffed. Although state regulators do not subject intrastate long
distance carriers to rate-of-return regulation, they heavily regulate
ILECs' intrastate minute-of-use access
charges to the long distance carriers. Because these intrastate access charges are generallymuch higher
than the FCC-regulated interstate access charges, intrastate toll prices have declined at a much slower pace
than interstate toll prices.
84
Centrex services are fully competitive with unregulated PBX equipment. The only practical difference
between the two is that Centrex switching and features are provided in the LEC central office switch, while
PBX switching and features are provided by a box on the customer's premises.
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ILEC /CLEC transactions.8s
Both antitrust and economic regulators should be wary of economic
theories that only mask the economic self-interest of the theory's sponsor.
The Bell System benefited for many decades from the demonstrably false
theory of the natural monopoly of the local and long distance telephone
systems. Cross-subsidization of competitive services by utility services is a
meaningless concept (except to the entrenched firms espousing the concept
in order to exclude the ILECs from new markets) when rate-of-return
regulation is abandoned, breaking the link between cost allocations and
rates. Reciprocal compensation whether espoused by ILECs or CLECs is
really a mechanism for subsidizing the company expected to receive the
most traffic.
Antitrust regulation rather than economic regulation should be the
regulatory mode of choice when anticompetitive conduct by the ILECs is of
concern. "Regulated competition" is an oxymoron. Detailed rules for
economic regulation of transactions between competitors are likely to lead to
the pursuit of loopholes in the regulations, not to the development of robust
competition.86
See Crandall, RobertW. and Hausman, Jerry A. (2000). Competition in U.S. Telecommunications
Service: Effects of the 1996 Legislation [Crandall and Hausman], in Peltzman, Sam andWinston, Clifford
(Eds.), Deregulation ofNetwork Industries - What's Next?. Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center
for Regulatory Studies. Crandall and Hausman write, "Since passage of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, competition for local residential wireline service has grown very slowly, and continued regulatory
barriers preventing the regional Bell operating companies from entering long-distance markets have cost
consumers a considerable amount in welfare losses. In sharp contrast, competition is robust in wireless
services, where prices have been deregulated."
Crandall and Hausman at 1 10: "[DJetailed cost-based regulation ofwholesale rates is not a satisfactory
approach for stimulating competition in this network industry. Rather, we would prefer an attempt by
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No matter how important the goal of stimulating competition,
regulators should remember that their job is to provide a competitive
marketplace, not to guarantee either initial success (such as the concept of
a "jump start") or long term viability of any particular class of competitors.
Regardless of ILECs' prior good or bad behavior, it is neither fair nor in the
long run pro-competitive to require ILECs to subsidize their competitors.
Neither ILECs nor CLECs should be given opportunities to extract subsidies
from each other or from interexchange carriers.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its interpretations by the
FCC need an overhaul. The incentives created by the Act and the FCC's
regulations prevent facilities-based competition for residential customers,
and primarily spur competition for Black Hole customers that provides little
if any public benefit. The FCC has very recently taken two good first steps
by reducing reciprocal compensation for Internet traffic and reducing
interstate access charges imposed by CLECs. These steps should be
extended, probably by statutory amendment, to eliminate reciprocal
compensation altogether and to ensure against unreasonable intrastate
access charges by CLECs.
Congress and the FCC should take a hard look at current rates and
rules for UNE pricing, which greatly reduce the incentives for CLECs to
regulators to undo the regulatory-created barriers to entry built into the retail rate structure. As long as
large numbers of subscribers - particularly residential subscribers in all but the most dense areas of the
country - are provided local service at rates below long-run incremental cost, entrants will have little
incentive to offer these subscribers service."
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build their own networks.87 Real competition will not develop as long as
most carriers are dependent upon reselling pieces of the ILEC network. In
particular, UNE Platform pricing should no longer be required, and UNEs
should be returned to their originally contemplated role as facilities useful
to "round out" a CLEC network in remote areas where there are not
sufficient concentrations of customers to justify the construction of new
loop facilities.
It is time to allow the BOCs to provide long distance services in all of
their territories. The "competitive checklist" of the 1996 Act has been
abused by competitors forcing BOCs to spend enormous time and resources
on compliance with items such as the provision of interoperable
"Operational Support Systems."88 AT&T, WorldCom and Sprint no longer
need (and probably never needed) protection against the
BOCs'
start-up
long distance ventures, and CLECs should begin to focus on their own
quality and cost of service rather than continue the endless round of
regulatory proceedings designed to wring out more concessions and more
subsidies from the BOCs.
In summary, it is time for the regulators to start letting go of economic
87 Ness Raises Pricing Issues; Analyst Sees 'New View Rising'. (2001, Feb. 12). Telecommunications
Reports. 67, pp. 10-11. FCC Commissioner Ness stated that UNE rates need attention because "you don't
want to encourage inefficient
competition"
and Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. analyst Daniel P. Reingold
stated that "TELRIC-based UNE and UNE-P [UNE Platform] pricing have the perverse effect of lowering
the [incumbents'] price umbrella to the point that true facilities-based local infrastructure is
'disincented.'"
88 Operational Support Systems are very costly modifications and enhancements to an ILECs ordering,
provisioning and repair systems to allow CLECs essentially the same access into the
systems for their
customers as the ILECs own service representatives have. The programming costs alone to make the
ILECs' legacy systems interoperable with CLEC systems are monumental. If the CLECs were not so
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regulation. Detailed economic regulation of telecommunications was only
justifiable in the first place on the assumption of a natural monopoly. The
free market model is the basis of our capitalistic society, and although it is
not perfect, a better one has yet to be found. There is no point for
regulators to try to emulate the results of a competitive market if a
competitive market is capable ofworking on its own.
Regulators therefore must define a new role for themselves, one less
concerned with the details of utility pricing and operations and more
focused on social policies that a competitive market cannot be expected to
achieve. For example, regulation, likely in the form of some kind of
subsidization mechanism, is probably required in the long run to assure the
affordability of telephone service in remote and sparsely-populated areas.
Regulation is probably not necessary to assure a basic level of service
quality, as long as competitive alternatives are available. Regulation is
probably necessary to mandate and underwrite a relay system for
hearing-
impaired customers to communicate. Regulation is probably not necessary
to set an ILECs prices to consumers or competitors, again where
competitive alternatives are available.
Where competitive alternatives are not available, regulators should
not try to "jump
start"
competition by providing subsidies from ILECs to
CLECs. These subsidies will inevitably provide perverse economic
incentives and will do nothing to ensure the long term viability of real
reliant on BOC UNEs, they would not need OSS access. The OSS requirement is generally the last and
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competition.
Where competitive alternatives are available, regulators should not
attempt to structure the market in ways that they believe will enhance
competition. They should instead find ways to remove themselves from the
equation and let the natural forces of the marketplace, driven by consumer
choices, pick the winners and the losers.
most difficult item on the competitive checklist that is the gateway for BOC entry into
interLATA markets.
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Appendix 1
Analysis ofResale and UNE Platform Rates in Rochester, New York
Table 1A Comparative ILEC Revenues
Measured Bus. Rates Retail 17% Discount UNE
Loops $11 $9 $10
Ports n/a n/a 3
Features 3 2 free
Local Usage 14 12 2
Sub. Line Charge 6 6 none
Operator Services n/a n/a 1
Total Local $34 $29 $16
LD Access 5 5 none
IntraLATA Toll 2 2 1
Grand Total $41 $35 $17
This table starts from a normal measured business customer's retail
rates. The dial tone line is priced at $ 1 1 . It is assumed that the customer
buys $3 of features and has $14 of local measured usage. The subscriber
line charge is roughly $6, and operator services are included in the cost of
the line. The ILEC therefore makes $34 in local revenues from this
customer. On the long distance side, it is assumed that the customer
makes $2 in intraLATA (regional toll) calls and that the ILEC charges
interexchange carriers $5 in access charges, with the interexchange carriers
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billing the customer for interLATA toll charges.
With a 17% discount, which is the current "total service"wholesale
discount applicable to Frontier Telephone of Rochester, the revenue impact
is a reduction of all local and intraLATA rates. The subscriber line charge is
not discounted, and access charges are not affected. Comparing the grand
total of revenues, the effective discount (i.e., the ILECs lost revenue) is 15%.
Under a UNE price structure, the dial tone line is split into a loop at $10
and a switch port at $3. By PSC order, the local usage UNE rate includes
all features inherent in the switch at no charge to the CLEC. Local usage is
priced at $.007 to the CLEC as compared to roughly $.04 to the end user.
By FCC order, long distance access charges belong to the UNE Platform
purchaser, the CLEC, so that the ILEC loses all $5 of access. Comparing
the grand total of revenues, the effective discount is nearly 59%. The
magnitude of this result is not sensitive to minor changes in the rates.
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Table IB Comparative Revenues Earned by the Carrier
Measured Bus. Rates ILEC Reseller UNE-P
Loops $11 $11 $11
Ports n/a n/a n/a
Features 3 3 3
Local Usage 14 14 14
Sub. Line Charge 6 6 6
Operator Services n/a n/a n/a
Total Local $34 $34 $34
LD Access 5 none 15
IntraLATA Toll 2 2 2
Grand Total $41 $36 $51
This table demonstrates why total service resale is such an unattractive
proposition and why the UNE Platform is so attractive for CLECs. When a
CLEC serves an end user, the CLEC will not be able to charge more than the
ILECs retail rates. Thus the CLEC, whatever its wholesale pricing, is likely
to have a retail price structure not too different from the ILECs. Thus all
three companies receive the same Total Local revenues from the customer.
Where the equivalence breaks down is in long distance access charges.
Under the total service resale model, the ILEC keeps all the access charges
and the reseller gets none. Under the UNE Platform model, not only do all
the access charges go to the CLEC, but the CLEC is permitted to charge
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interexchange carriers a per-minute rate that is many times higher than
that of the ILEC. Thus the reseller ends up with less and the UNE Platform
purchaser ends up with more gross revenues than the ILEC.
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